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I. INTRODUCTION 
Economists describe the current global financial crisis as the 
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.1 Moreover, the U.S. 
 
  Leroy Sorensen Merrifield Professor of Law, George Washington University School 
of Law; AB Harvard College, JD Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Gordon Smith for 
inviting me to the BYU Law Review Symposium: “Evaluating Legal Origins Theory,” as well 
as the participants of the symposium for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. All 
errors, of course, are mine. 
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government’s response has been almost as unprecedented as the 
crisis it is aimed to forestall and correct. Scholars have debated at 
length not only the cause of the crisis,2 but also about whether the 
crisis and its severity could have been predicted.3 By contrast, 
relatively little attention has been paid to whether we could have 
predicted America’s response to the crisis. Because the legal origins 
theory purports to predict how countries respond to economic and 
social problems, it has the potential to fill this void.4 In that regard, 
this Article seeks to test that theory’s predictive value with respect to 
America’s crisis response, and thereby shed some light on the 
strength of, and limits to, the theory. 
Beginning in 1997, four authors published a series of articles 
based on a theory that the historical origins of a country’s laws shape 
its legal rules and regulations, as well as its fundamental approach to 
problem-solving.5 This theory, known as the legal origins theory or 
LLSV,6 predicts that a country’s legal origin influences its laws and 
regulations. As a result, the theory asserts that common law 
countries and civil law countries will differ with respect to their laws 
and regulations because of their legal origins. Moreover, the theory 
suggests that a country’s legal origins will dictate how a country 
responds to social and economic problems. That is, a country’s legal 
 
 1. E.g., Three Top Economists Agree 2009 Worst Financial Crisis Since Great Depression; 
Risks Increase if Right Steps Are Not Taken, REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.reuters. 
com/article/pressRelease/idUS193520+27-Feb-2009+BW20090227. 
 2. See, e.g., infra Part III.A. 
 3. See, e.g., Peter Coy et al., What Good Are Economists Anyway?, BUS. WK., Apr. 16, 
2009, at 26 (explaining why economists mostly failed to predict the crisis); Stephen Mihm, Dr. 
Doom, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2008, at MM26 (describing audience’s skepticism to predictions 
by NYU economist Nouriel Roubini that a crisis was brewing). 
 4. See Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 285, 306–09 (2008). 
 5. The four authors are Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, 
and Robert Vishny. E.g., Nicholas Thompson, Common Denominator, LEGAL AFFAIRS, 
Jan./Feb. 2005, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-
2005/feature_thompson_janfeb05.msp. For examples of these articles, see Rafael La Porta et 
al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222 (1999) [hereinafter La Porta, 
Quality of Government] (investigating through empirical data and comparisons what 
determines the quality of governments across several countries); Rafael La Porta et al., Law 
and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (examining the origin and enforcement of laws 
regarding the protection of corporate shareholders and creditors across forty-nine diverse civil 
law and common law countries); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External 
Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) (examining the connection between legal protections for 
investors and development of capital markets in various countries). 
 6. An acronym of the four original theorists’ last names. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2010 7:54 PM 
1571 The Legal Origins Theory in Crisis 
 1573 
origins shape the manner in which it confronts new economic and 
political challenges.7 As a result, countries in the civil law tradition 
will not only respond to problems differently than countries in a 
common law tradition, but will also respond to such problems in a 
particular way that is unique and consistent with their legal tradition. 
In this respect, the theory not only explains the differences in the 
development of institutions, but also reflects a “mode of thought” or 
attitude about how best to deal with problems.8 Moreover, the 
theory contends that a country’s legal tradition tends to better 
predict its institutions and rules than other cultural, political, social 
or economic factors.9 
Important for purposes of this Article, the theory purports to 
have at least some predictive value during times of upheaval.10 
During such times, when legal rules change in response to a crisis, 
the legal origins theory predicts that they will change in ways that are 
consistent with a country’s legal tradition.11 This is because, at its 
core, the theory reflects a fundamental approach to problem 
solving.12 The legal origins theory stems from the premise that legal 
origins “represent fundamentally different strategies of social control 
of economic life, which express themselves in how countries confront 
new economic or political challenges.”13 In other words, America’s 
legal origins should strongly influence the manner in which the 
United States approaches economic problems, and that approach 
should be fundamentally distinct from the manner in which 
countries from a civil law tradition respond to such problems. In this 
regard, the legal origins theory should be particularly relevant in 
times of crisis because it should be able to predict the manner in 
which countries respond to crisis. If this theory is accurate, America’s 
 
 7. La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 307. 
 8. See id. at 287, 307. La Porta and his co-authors, in an earlier draft of this paper, 
suggested that the legal origins families represent “expressions of fundamental approaches to 
solving social problems.” La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, Second 
Draft, June 4, 2007, at 4, http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/ 
corporate_governance/papers/2007fall-Speakers_9-25_Shleifer.pdf [hereinafter La Porta, 
Economic Consequences, Second Draft]. 
 9. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 310–15. 
 10. The Legal Origins Theory purports to have some predictive value that helps to 
explain a country’s actions. Hence, this Article refers to both the predictive and explanatory 
value of the Legal Origins Theory. 
 11. La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 308. 
 12. Id. at 307. 
 13. La Porta, Economic Consequences, Second Draft, supra note 8, at 7. 
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legal tradition should have a profound impact on its current crisis 
response. That being said, it is important to note that legal origin 
theorists themselves suggest that the theory may not operate during 
times of particularly severe financial turmoil.14 With this limitation in 
mind, this Article seeks to test the boundaries of the legal origins 
theory by assessing whether it could have predicted the manner in 
which the U.S. has responded to the current economic crisis or if the 
turmoil was so significant that the theory loses its predictive value. 
Legal origins theory would predict that the United States 
response would be steeped in a common law tradition and therefore 
be at odds with a response expected from civil law entities. After 
examining America’s response to date, this Article notes that, at least 
on the surface, its current response seems to run counter to its legal 
origins in some fundamental ways. This inconsistency suggests that 
political, social, and economic forces do more to explain the United 
States response to significant financial and economic turmoil than its 
legal origins. From this perspective, this Article maintains that the 
current crisis is so severe that it overwhelms any explanatory or 
predictive value that may have been derived from the legal origins 
theory. To be sure, a more nuanced examination of the United 
States response does illuminate some strands of its legal tradition that 
have emerged in the context of its crisis response, suggesting that the 
theory may be operative, put perhaps in a more muted and nuanced 
manner.  
Part I of this Article gives some background on the legal origins 
theory. Part II briefly highlights the current economic crisis and 
pinpoints some of America’s principal responses. Part III then 
explores whether those responses are consistent with the legal origins 
theory. This Part demonstrates the manner in which those responses 
run counter to America’s origins, thus undermining the predictive 
value and hence strength of that theory, at least in the context of a 
major crisis. However, Part III also reveals some ways in which the 
United States response may be deemed consistent with the legal 
origins tradition, and thus may validate the theory’s predictive value 
even during severe upheaval. Part IV offers some concluding 
thoughts about the relevance of the theory in crisis.  
 
 14. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 327.  
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2010 7:54 PM 
1571 The Legal Origins Theory in Crisis 
 1575 
II. THE LEGAL ORIGINS THEORY 
The legal origins theory contends that the historical origins of a 
country’s laws determine its legal rules as well as the nature of its 
political, economic, and legal institutions. Thus, legal origins explain 
why countries have developed distinct legal rules and regulations 
across a broad range of disciplines as well as distinct modes of 
resource allocation and interactions between the government and its 
citizens.15 Moreover, legal origins can often better explain a 
country’s legal and economic institutions than political and cultural 
variables.16 
The legal origins theory rests on at least two premises. First, 
most countries received their legal system through colonization or 
some other involuntary means, making their legal origins largely 
exogenous.17 In other words, conquering countries export their legal 
system to other nations.18 As a result, the theory may lose its 
explanatory or predictive force if a country voluntarily chooses its 
legal origin—as is the case with Japan.19 Second, countries’ legal 
traditions essentially fall into one of two categories: civil or common 
law.20 From this perspective, differences in legal origins mainly 
 
 15. See generally Juan Botero et al., The Regulation of Labor, 119 Q.J. ECON. 1339 
(2004) (investigating labor market regulation through applicable laws in eighty-five countries 
including French civil law, Scandinavian civil law, socialist, and common law countries); La 
Porta, Quality of Government, supra note 5, at 261–62 (comparing and contrasting the 
influence of socialist, French civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian civil law, and common 
law legal origins on government performance). 
 16. See, e.g., David M. Foster, Politics, Legal Origins, and the Roots of Modern Economic 
Institutions (Mar. 25, 2005) (seminar paper for Advanced Issues in Corporate Governance, 
Professor Mark J. Roe), at 3–4. 
 17. La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 286. 
 18. Id. at 288 (“[A] key feature of legal traditions is that they have been transplanted 
typically though not always through conquest or colonization, from relatively few mother 
countries to most of the rest of the world.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 19. Though Japan’s legal system was influenced by German civil law tradition, Japan 
chose to incorporate that influence voluntarily rather than have it enforced through 
colonization. See id. at 290. 
 20. Id. at 288. To be sure, within the civil law tradition, the legal origins theory 
recognizes the distinctions between French, German, and Scandinavian civil law, while noting 
that the distinctions are relatively subtle. La Porta, Quality of Government, supra note 5, at 
231; see also La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 390. The theory also recognizes the socialist legal 
tradition, which originates in the Soviet Union, noting that such tradition falls within the civil 
law family, but with pronounced differences when compared with other civil law systems. La 
Porta et al., supra note 4, at 288; La Porta, Quality of Government, supra note 5, at 231. 
Nevertheless, the theory rests primarily on the notion that France and England established two 
dominant forms of legal systems that were then exported to countries that they conquered. 
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originate from either the English common law system or the French 
civil law system, both of which form the foundations of modern 
common and civil law systems.21 Countries with common law origins 
include the United States, Canada, Australia, India, and South 
Africa.22 Although the civil law tradition originates in Roman law, it 
is generally identified with France and the countries influenced by 
French conquest including Portugal, Spain, Northern and Sub-
Sahara Africa, and French Caribbean Islands.23 Legal origin theorists 
also have referred to groups of countries that share the same legal 
tradition as legal families,24 and in this vein, England represents 
“mother-country” of the common law family while France is 
matriarch of the civil law countries.25 
Legal origin theorists contend that a country’s legal origin 
impacts the nature of its institutions, and leads to the development 
of distinct features. Thus, common law systems embrace limited state 
intervention and restraints on government power, resulting from its 
emphasis on protecting individual rights and their private property 
rights.26 By contrast, the civil law tradition is associated with 
enhanced government ownership and control.27 Hence, growth of 
administrative power represents a hallmark of civil law.28 Another 
critical hallmark of a civil law system is the central control of banks. 
Civil law systems also feature policies aimed at nationalization and 
direct state control of industry.29  
In addition to these features associated with government 
intervention, legal origins determine the nature and role of the 
judiciary within a country. For the common law system, judicial rule-
making and judicial independence are absolutely essential.30 
Moreover, the power of judicial review represents a hallmark of the 
 
 21. La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 288–89. 
 22. Id. at 288. 
 23. Id. at 289 (“[T]he civil law tradition is the oldest, the most influential, and the most 
widely distributed around the world . . . .”). 
 24. E.g., KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
68 (1998); La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 286. 
 25. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 288, 318. 
 26. La Porta, Quality of Government, supra note 5, at 232. 
 27. See generally id. at 231–33 (asserting that the civil legal tradition demonstrates and 
results in the creation of institutions to increase state power). 
 28. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 304. 
 29. Id. at 308. 
 30. See id. at 305. 
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common law tradition. In this regard, judicial lawmaking is a central 
feature of the common law ideology. 
The legal origins theory also maintains that legal traditions are 
robustly linked to financial development. Thus, common law 
countries tend to be more economically developed with more 
sophisticated financial markets and development.31 This results in 
part from the strong emphasis on investor protection as well as the 
higher quality of contract enforcement that emanates from the 
common law tradition.32 It also results from a more independent 
judiciary that helps secure property rights.33 Importantly, legal origin 
theorists do not maintain that common law always produces the 
most economically efficient outcome.34 
In addition to being highly correlated to particular institutions 
and modes of governmental regulation, the theory predicts that 
countries will adopt particular attitudes or ideologies based on their 
legal origins. Thus, because legal origins represent distinct strategies 
regarding control of economic life, legal origins represent 
fundamentally different strategies regarding how to confront 
economic or political challenges.35 In this respect, legal origins 
influence governmental approaches to problem solving, predicting 
the strategies a country will employ to grapple with social and 
economic concerns.36 The theory predicts that civil law governments’ 
responses will focus on expanding government control, while 
common law governments will favor market solutions and reliance 
on the judiciary.37 The theory further predicts that common law 
governments will steer clear not only from administrative solutions 
when crafting solutions to new problems, but also from the 
nationalization of banks and companies.38  
Finally, legal origins theorists posit that the theory may better 
predict a country’s institutions and attitudes than other factors. To 
be sure, the theory does not dismiss the importance of political, 
cultural, or social influences. However, legal origin theorists note 
 
 31. See id. at 294–98. 
 32. Id. at 298. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 309. 
 35. Id. at 307. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. Id. at 308. 
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that legal origins often have greater predictive power than such 
influences.39 Theorists do caution that the saliency of the legal 
origins hypothesis may be tested depending on the nature and extent 
of certain crisis, suggesting that the theory may have important 
limitations. 
These observations regarding the predictive power of the legal 
origins theory appear to have relevance in predicting the 
government’s response to the current crisis. Indeed, the legal origins 
theory certainly includes predictions about the content of that 
response as well as the ideologies that would shape that response. 
The next parts of this Article focus on the government’s response 
and the extent to which the legal origins theory comports with that 
response. 
III. FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE 
Many theories exist regarding what caused the current financial 
crisis and why the crisis has had such a devastating impact on the 
economy in the United States and abroad.40 However, most scholars 
 
 39. See id. (noting that the distinct strategies with respect to social control of business 
and institutions among countries within different legal traditions have persisted despite political 
and other changes within such countries); see also Foster, supra note 16. 
 40. See generally Steven Davidoff & David Zaring, Big Deal: The Government’s Response 
to the Financial Crisis, at 2, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1306342 (noting that 
regulatory failures played a role in the financial crisis); Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, 
Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis (Dec. 5, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020396; Hershey Friedman & Linda Friedman, The Global 
Financial Crisis: What Went Wrong?, Mar. 9, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1356193 (noting that the lack of appropriate regulation of the market 
in general and derivatives in particular, single-minded pursuit of self-interest, and the failure of 
rating agencies played a role in the financial crisis); Gary Gorton, Yale School of Management 
& NBER, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole Conference: The Panic of 2007 
(Aug. 4, 2008), http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/2008/Gorton.08.04.08.pdf.; 
Austin Murphy, The Financial Crisis of 2008: Causes and Solutions (Nov. 4, 2008), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1295344&rec=1&srcabs=1306342 
(noting that the crisis had such a broad impact because of theoretical modeling based on 
unrealistic assumptions which led to fundamental mispricing of credit default swaps); Faten 
Sabry & Thomas Schopflocher, The Subprime Meltdown: A Primer (June 21, 2007) at 9, 
http://www.nera.com/image/PUB_SubPrimer_1108.pdf (pinpointing, among other things, 
the relaxation of underwriting standards and the increase in short-term interests as factors 
contributing to the financial crisis); John B. Taylor, The Financial Crisis and the Policy 
Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong (Nov. 2008), at 2–3, http://www. 
stanford.edu/~johntayl/FCPR.pdf (noting that monetary excesses, or relatively loose 
monetary policy reflected in unusually low interest rates, was the main cause of the financial 
crisis).  
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agree that many factors played a role in causing the crisis and its 
ripple effect through the financial sector and broader economy. As 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke noted, those factors 
included “widespread declines in underwriting standards, 
breakdowns in lending oversight by investors and rating agencies, 
increased reliance on complex and opaque credit instruments that 
proved fragile under stress, and unusually low compensation for risk-
taking.”41 This section does not seek to analyze these factors or 
otherwise examine the various theories regarding the cause of the 
crisis, but rather provides a brief account of the financial crisis and 
the government’s response in order to examine if that response 
comports with the legal origins theory’s apparent predictions 
regarding how the United States would respond to crisis.42 
A. A Financial Crisis and Recession 
Most experts pinpoint the immediate cause of the current global 
financial crisis as the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble and the 
related collapse of the subprime mortgage market.43 The boom and 
 
 41. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve, Speech at the Stamp Lecture, London 
School of Economics: The Crisis and the Policy Response (Jan. 13, 2009), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090113a.htm.  
 42. For a more detailed thought assessment of the crisis and its causes, see Demyanyk & 
Van Hemert, supra note 40; Gorton, supra note 40; Murphy, supra note 40. 
 43. In January 2009, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke described the crisis as 
follows: 
  For almost a year and a half the global financial system has been under 
extraordinary stress—stress that has now decisively spilled over to the global 
economy more broadly. The proximate cause of the crisis was the turn of the 
housing cycle in the United States and the associated rise in delinquencies on 
subprime mortgages, which imposed substantial losses on many financial institutions 
and shook investor confidence in credit markets. However, although the subprime 
debacle triggered the crisis, the developments in the U.S. mortgage market were 
only one aspect of a much larger and more encompassing credit boom whose impact 
transcended the mortgage market to affect many other forms of credit. Aspects of 
this broader credit boom included widespread declines in underwriting standards, 
breakdowns in lending oversight by investors and rating agencies, increased reliance 
on complex and opaque credit instruments that proved fragile under stress, and 
unusually low compensation for risk-taking.  
  The abrupt end of the credit boom has had widespread financial and economic 
ramifications. Financial institutions have seen their capital depleted by losses and 
writedowns and their balance sheets clogged by complex credit products and other 
illiquid assets of uncertain value. Rising credit risks and intense risk aversion have 
pushed credit spreads to unprecedented levels, and markets for securitized assets, 
except for mortgage securities with government guarantees, have shut down. 
Heightened systemic risks, falling asset values, and tightening credit have in turn 
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bust of the housing market led to financial and credit crises that 
spread around the globe and triggered a recession.  
Between 1997 and 2006, the United States experienced a 
significant housing bubble, increasing the average price of an 
American home by 124%.44 This housing bubble was encouraged by 
a combination of factors, including low interest rates and 
governmental policy encouraging homeownership.45 For existing 
homeowners, the increased value of their homes meant that they 
could extract equity from their home by refinancing at lower interest 
rates. For new homeowners, low interest rates coupled with policies 
encouraging home ownership translated into lower monthly 
payments that made homes more affordable to more people.  
Notably, home price appreciation outpaced increases in median 
income levels in record numbers. For example, from 2000 to 2005 
such appreciation outpaced income growth by more than six-fold.46 
Consequently, while houses were more expensive, income levels did 
not rise to meet that expense. Instead, borrowers were able to 
purchase these more expensive houses by relying on mortgage 
products that lowered their monthly payments, such as interest-only 
and balloon payment loans.47 The most popular and prevalent of 
such products were adjustable rate mortgages, or ARMs, which were 
mortgages with relatively easy initial terms and rates that would reset 
periodically at higher, market-based interest rates.48 By providing for 
 
taken a heavy toll on business and consumer confidence and precipitated a sharp 
slowing in global economic activity. The damage, in terms of lost output, lost jobs, 
and lost wealth, is already substantial.  
Bernanke, supra note 41. 
 44. CSI: Credit Crunch, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2007. 
 45. Economist John Taylor notes that the U.S. monetary policy was too easy, or “loose 
fitting,” because of unusually low interest rates, and this monetary excess was the primary cause 
of the boom and bust. At the very least, Taylor suggests, the unusually low interest rate policy 
accelerated the housing boom and bust. John B. Taylor, The Financial Crisis and the Policy 
Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong (Nov. 2008), 
http://www.stanford.edu/~johntayl/FCPR.pdf. Taylor also indicates that other countries 
deviated from more appropriate interest rates, and that the housing boom was largest when 
these deviations were the largest. Id. at 5. Taylor concludes that these global policies were 
likely influenced by the Fed’s interest rate decisions. Id. at 6.  
 46. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF 
THE NATION’S HOUSING: 2008, at 7 (2008), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/ 
markets/son2008/son2008.pdf [hereinafter State of Nation’s Housing]. 
 47. Id. at 1–2. Interest-only loans refer to loans that defer the payment of principal for a 
set number of years.  
 48. Id.; see also Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 40, at 3. 
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lower payments prior to the reset, ARMs and similar mortgage 
products enabled people to secure larger mortgages and purchase 
more expensive homes than they could otherwise afford. So long as 
home prices increased and interest rates remained low, these 
mortgage products appeared to benefit homeowners despite the 
possibility of resetting at less favorable terms. This is because if 
borrowers found themselves unable to make payments once the rate 
reset, they had sufficient equity in their homes to refinance at a lower 
rate or sell their home at a profit. During this period, people took on 
additional debt to refinance or purchase homes, which caused home 
mortgage debt to increase dramatically, reaching record highs in 
2006 and 2007.49  
Coupled with the housing bubble was the proliferation of 
subprime mortgages—mortgages issued to borrowers with imperfect 
credit scores because of impaired or little credit history, high debt-
to-income ratios, or some other characteristic that made the 
borrower more prone to default.50 Such loans are distinct from prime 
loans offered to borrowers with relatively good credit history. 
Although the interest rates on subprime loans were higher than 
those on prime loans, the vast majority of subprime loans were 
ARMs with low introductory teaser rates, thereby ensuring low 
monthly payments for borrowers.51 When such teaser rates reset, 
most subprime borrowers simply refinanced into another subprime 
loan.52 Subprime loan originations exploded during the early 2000s, 
rising from $120 billion in 2001 to $625 billion in 2005.53 By 2005, 
subprime loans comprised some twenty percent of the nation’s 
mortgage lending.54  
 
 49. Colin Barr, The $4 Trillion Housing Headache, FORTUNE, May 27, 2009 (noting 
that home mortgage debt was at its highest levels ever in 2006 and 2007, with 2008 being the 
third-highest on record, and that Americans’ mortgage debt was $10.4 trillion at the end of 
2008). 
 50. Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 40, at 2. Subprime loans are generally associated 
with borrowers with a credit score below 620. Id. However, predatory and other unsavory 
lending practices sometimes resulted in borrowers obtaining subprime loans even when their 
credit scores would have qualified them for prime loans. Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime 
Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy As Housing Boom, Industry Pushed Loans to Broader 
Market, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2007, at A1. 
 51. Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 40, at 3–4. 
 52. Id. at 3. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 1. 
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The sharp rise in subprime mortgages was spurred by financial 
innovation that reduced the risk associated with providing loans to 
default-prone borrowers, government policies that encouraged 
homeownership, policies that increased institutions’ ability to take on 
additional debt, and relaxed underwriting standards for loans. First, 
financial innovations based on the mortgage industry served to 
redistribute and shift the risk associated with subprime mortgages, 
spurring the demand for such mortgages. Financial innovation took 
several forms. As an initial matter, the process of securitization 
enabled banks to pool various mortgages and sell them to investors 
in the form of mortgage-backed securities, shifting the risk of such 
mortgages to investors.55 Similarly, collateralized debt obligations, or 
CDOs, enabled entities to pool mortgage assets and sell them in 
different classes or tranches as securities, again passing the risk 
related to such assets to investors.56 Even when the tranches 
consisted of subprime mortgages, many of them received high credit 
ratings, making them attractive to investors.57 Another important 
innovation was credit default swaps and other financial derivative 
products that enabled companies to purchase contracts to hedge the 
risk associated with subprime mortgages.58 Such swaps essentially 
allowed companies to purchase insurance against the risk of default.59 
Insurance entities, particularly American International Group, Inc. 
(“AIG”), recorded record profits as a result of their involvement 
with credit default swaps insuring mortgage-backed securities.60 
More importantly, the use of these swaps and other financial 
innovations increased dramatically in the last decade, accelerating 
 
 55. Id. at 4–7. 
 56. DOUGLAS LUCAS ET AL., COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS: STRUCTURES 
AND ANALYSIS (2006); JANET TAVAKOLI, COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND 
STRUCTURED FINANCE, 14–29 (2003). 
 57.  Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the 
Crisis, June 29, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1427167; Elliot 
Blair Smith, ‘Race to Bottom’ at Moody’s, S&P Secured Subprime's Boom, Bust, 
Bloomberg.com, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109 
&sid=ax3vfya_Vtdo. 
 58. Partnoy, supra note 57, at 219–21; see also Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: 
The Next Crisis?, TIME, Mar. 17, 2008. 
 59.  LUCAS, supra note 56, at 219–21. 
 60. Robert O’Harrow & Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfall, WASH. POST, Dec. 
31, 2008, at A01, available at http://w3.lexis.com/research2/delivery/download/retrieve. 
do?filename=downgrades__downfalls.pdf&jobId=1823%3A177117329&ssb=0_512012564. 
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companies’ appetite for risky loans upon which they could use such 
innovations.61 
Second, government policies encouraging home ownership, 
particularly for middle and low income families, prompted the 
creation of new loan products, in lieu of the conventional thirty-year 
fixed mortgage, aimed at making mortgages more affordable. 
Indeed, in order to encourage affordable housing and more flexible 
loan products, government sponsored entities Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac significantly increased their purchases of mortgage-
backed securities backed by subprime loans, further fueling the 
market for such securities and loans.62  
Third, policies that increased the ability of financial institutions 
to bear significant amounts of debt enabled such institutions to 
heavily invest in mortgage backed securities and other products, 
accelerating demand for subprime products. In 2004, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) altered its net capital rule in 
a manner that enabled certain entities to leverage themselves an 
unlimited number of times.63 Consequently, by 2007 financial 
institutions routinely used thirty times leverage when making 
investments.64 The new rule therefore not only enabled such 
institutions to increase their investments in debt, but also ensured 
that such institutions had very little equity to offset their high debt 
levels. 
Finally, the increased demand for mortgages not only 
encouraged banks to lower their underwriting standards, but also 
prompted some entities to engage in predatory lending practices. 
 
 61. In 1994, JP Morgan introduced the first credit default swap, and over the next 
decade and a half, credit default swaps became the most widely traded derivative product. Id. 
 62. Carol D. Leoning, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the Crisis, WASH. POST, June 10, 
2008, at A01, available at http://w3.lexis.com/research2/delivery/download/retrieve.do? 
filename=hud_mortgage.pdf&jobId=1822%3A177127766&ssb=0_51208285. 
 63. Stephen Labaton, The Reckoning: Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/ 
03sec.html. In 2004, the SEC changed its net capital rule, allowing firms with more than $5 
million in assets to leverage themselves an unlimited number of times rather than the 12 to 1 
ratio that had been in existence since 1975 when the SEC established the net capital rule.  
 64. John Mauldin, A Positive Third Quarter?, THE RESOURCE 2–3 (July 2009), 
http://reonationwide.com/resource/09%20july.pdf. When the rule was altered, five firms 
qualified and subsequently enhanced their leverage: Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill 
Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley. Id. None of the firms survived the crisis as 
independent entities, likely in large part due to the fact that their debt-to-equity ratio was too 
high to absorb the losses they suffered as a result of the crisis. Id. 
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Because they no longer had to absorb the risk of such lending 
practices, banks were increasingly willing to offer loans to borrowers 
with little or no down payment or real proof of income. Such 
practices not only fueled the growth of the subprime industry, but 
increased the likelihood that borrowers would obtain mortgages that 
they could ill-afford. Some entities went further, purposefully luring 
borrowers into inappropriate loans in light of their credit history and 
income levels.65 Interestingly, one Wall Street Journal report found 
that sixty-one percent of borrowers with subprime loans had credit 
scores that qualified them for more attractive prime loans.66 In the 
end, an insatiable appetite for subprime mortgages negatively 
affected many different types of borrowers. Relaxed underwriting 
standards, along with the aforementioned factors, ensured the rapid 
growth of the subprime mortgage industry, and thus served to inflate 
the housing bubble. 
In 2006 and 2007, the housing bubble burst, causing a decline 
in housing prices and a subsequent rise in home delinquencies and 
foreclosures. In the first quarter of 2006, real estate prices began 
cooling, and between the fourth quarter of 2005 and the first 
quarter of 2006, the median U.S. housing price fell more than three 
percent, beginning a steady decline in the market.67 The year 2007 
saw the largest drop in home prices in twenty years,68 and the first 
annual median price decline since the Great Depression.69 The 
decline in housing prices made it difficult to refinance or sell homes 
at a profit. Moreover, in 2004 interest rates began to climb, ensuring 
that ARMs reset at higher rates, making it difficult for homeowners 
to afford their new monthly payments.70 As a result, the rate of 
 
 65. Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007); David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating 
Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 985 (2006). 
 66. Brooks & Simon, supra note 50, at A01. 
 67. Les Christie, Real Estate Cools Down, May 16, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/ 
2006/05/15/real_estate/NAR_firstQ2005_home_prices/index.htm.  
 68. See Martin H. Bosworth, Home Prices Drop Sharply: Unsold Homes Increase, 
ConsumerAffairs.com, Aug. 29, 2007, available at http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news 
04/2007/08/home_sales02.html. 
 69. Mike Sunnucks, National Home Price Decline in 2007 Called First Drop Since Great 
Depression, PHOENIX BUSINESS JOURNAL, Jan. 24, 2008, http://sanjose.bizjournals.com/ 
phoenix/stories/2008/01/21/daily45.html. 
 70. Press Release, IRS, Interest Rates Increase for the Second Quarter of 2004, 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=120820,00.html.  
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delinquencies and foreclosures began to rise. By August of 2008, 
more than six percent of all mortgages were delinquent, while more 
than two percent of loans were in foreclosure, both of which reflect 
record highs.71 Most of the defaults and foreclosures were on ARMs, 
particularly subprime ARMs.72 In the first quarter of 2007, the 
delinquency rate for subprime loans increased to more than thirteen 
percent, more than five times the delinquency rate for prime loans.73 
Prime ARM foreclosures have also started to rise, and experts predict 
that new foreclosures will likely be dominated by prime ARMs.74  
These problems in the housing market triggered a collapse of the 
subprime mortgage industry. More than twenty-five subprime 
lending firms declared bankruptcy in February and March of 2007. 
In April 2007, the largest independent U.S. subprime lender, New 
Century Financial Corporation, filed for bankruptcy.75 In January 
2008, Bank of America purchased Countrywide Financial, the largest 
U.S. mortgage lender, for $4 billion as a result of its losses in the 
mortgage market.76  
 
 71. Press Release, Delinquencies and Foreclosures Increase in Latest MBA Nat’l 
Delinquency Survey, http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/64769.htm (Sept. 
5, 2008) (national survey by the Mortgage Bankers Association). The significant rise in state 
foreclosures in California and Florida enhanced the foreclosures percentages and overwhelmed 
improvements in other states. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Assoc., Delinquencies Decrease in Latest MBA 
Nat’l Delinquency Survey, http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/55132.htm 
(June 14, 2007) (reporting that delinquency rate for prime loans increased to 2.58% and to 
13.77% for subprime loans). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Julie Creswell, Mortgage Lender New Century Financial Files for Bankruptcy, 
NYTIMES.COM, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/02/business/world 
business/02iht-loans.5.5118838.html. The company’s shares plunged from nearly $66 a share 
in 2004 to $1 in 2007. Id. In March 2007, New Century’s shares lost 90% of their value, and 
the NYSE halted trading in their shares. David Cho, Huge Mortgage Lender Files Bankruptcy, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2007, at A01. When it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, New 
Century also laid off more than half of its workforce. Id. 
 76. The Associated Press, Bank of America to Acquire Countrywide, MSNBC.COM, Jan. 
11, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22606833. One of the first signals that the 
decline and crisis in the housing and subprime market was being mirrored around the globe 
was on September 13, 2007, when the Bank of England agreed to provide an emergency loan 
to the Northern Rock, one of the UK’s largest mortgage lenders. Northern Rock Gets Bank 
Bailout, BBC NEWS, Sept. 13, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6994099.stm. 
Of course, the article indicates that most believed the problems at Northern Rock and in the 
mortgage industry were temporary in nature. Id. This would prove false as some five months 
later, on February 17, 2008, Britain nationalized Northern Rock. Gonzalo Vian & Loveday 
Morris, Northern Rock Nationalized as U.K. Rejects Virgin Bid, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 17, 
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Further evidence of the market’s deterioration emerged with the 
difficulties experienced by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Both 
entities, heavily invested in the subprime markets, experienced 
dramatic drops in stock prices and severe liquidity problems. As a 
result, on September 7, 2008, the government seized control of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, placing them into government 
conservatorship.77 At that point, such entities owned or guaranteed 
about half of the mortgage market.78 
The interlinked nature of the financial innovations that relied on 
the prime and subprime mortgage industry ensured that declines in 
that industry would severely impact other sectors. Financial 
institutions that had invested in the industry began experiencing 
significant losses and liquidity issues. Indeed, the securitization 
market ground to a halt and credit markets froze as institutions that 
held or insured mortgage-backed securities watched their assets drop 
dramatically in value. 
Entities invested in the subprime mortgage market began 
admitting to significant losses. For example, by the end of July 2007, 
Bear Stearns announced that two of its hedge funds that had 
invested in various mortgage-backed securities had lost almost all of 
their capital and would file for bankruptcy.79 Then too, the 
investment banking industry, with its heavy involvement in 
 
2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aR399_tyWImw. The 
move represented the first time since 1984 that the government was forced to nationalize a 
bank, and England’s biggest bank nationalization since 1946. Id. 
 77. Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., on Treasury and Federal Housing 
Finance Agency Protection to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm. In explaining the move, Treasury 
Secretary Paulson stated: 
And let me make clear what today's actions mean for Americans and their families. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are so large and so interwoven in our financial system 
that a failure of either of them would cause great turmoil in our financial markets 
here at home and around the globe. This turmoil would directly and negatively 
impact household wealth: from family budgets, to home values, to savings for 
college and retirement. A failure would affect the ability of Americans to get home 
loans, auto loans and other consumer credit and business finance. And a failure 
would be harmful to economic growth and job creation. That is why we have taken 
these actions today.  
Id. 
 78. Charles Duhigg, Loan-Agency Woes Swell from a Trickle to a Torrent, 
NYTIMES.COM, Jul. 11, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/11/business/ 
11ripple.html. 
 79. Gretchen Morgenson, Bear Stearns Says Battered Hedge Funds Are Worth Little, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2007, at C02.  
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mortgage-backed securities and derivative products, found itself in 
significant turmoil. In fact, the major firms were unable to survive 
without significant financial assistance and intervention. In March 
2008, Bear Stearns announced major liquidity problems and was 
granted a twenty-eight day emergency loan from the Federal Reserve 
(the “Fed”).80 Two days later, in a transaction facilitated by financing 
from the Fed, JPMorgan Chase announced that it would purchase 
Bear Stearns for $2 a share, though the amount was later increased 
to $10 a share.81 On September 14, 2008, after suffering liquidity 
problems similar to Bear Stearns and a forty-five percent decline in 
share price, Lehman Brothers was unable to obtain the same 
government financial assistance as Bear Stearns and filed for 
bankruptcy, making it the largest bankruptcy in history at $639 
billion.82  
On September 15, 2008, Bank of America announced its $50 
billion purchase of Merrill Lynch in order rescue the firm from near 
collapse.83 On September 21, 2008, Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley, the remaining two largest investment banks, announced that 
they would convert into bank holding companies, which exposed 
them to additional regulation, but also afforded them access to loans 
from the Fed.84  
The collapse of the subprime mortgage industry also negatively 
impacted the insurance industry. Most notably, AIG, which had 
some $441 billion in credit default swaps, began suffering significant 
losses.85 On September 16, 2008, the Fed loaned AIG $85 million 
 
 80. Bear Stearns reported a $12 billion drop in liquid assets, which represented a sixty-
seven percent decline. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 40, at 13. 
 81. Id. at 16–20. 
 82. Some have argued that the government’s failure to intervene on Lehman’s behalf 
worsened the financial crisis, but Taylor contends that pinpointing the non-intervention 
decision as the primary reason for the increased severity of the financial crisis is questionable. 
Instead, it is likely that Paulson’s testimony on the severity of the problem drove the market as 
well as uncertainty about how the government would respond to the problem. Taylor, supra 
note 40, at 16–17. 
 83. “Bank of America’s chief executive . . . [claimed] that officials in the Bush 
administration and the Federal Reserve threatened to remove top executives of the bank” if it 
refused to agree to the merger with Merrill Lynch. Sean Lengell, Bank Reports Threat by Fed, 
WASH. TIMES, June 12, 2009, at A01. 
 84. See Neil Irwin & Binyamin Appelbaum, Giant Investment Banks Grasp for 
Government Safety Net, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2008, at A01. 
 85. See Carol D. Leonnig, Government Again Expands AIG Rescue Plan, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 11, 2008, at D01. 
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amid concerns that AIG would collapse and trigger widespread losses 
throughout the industry and financial sector.86 In exchange, the 
government took a 79.9% stake in AIG.87 In October 2008, the Fed 
authorized the borrowing of up to $37.8 billion in securities from 
AIG.88 As of August 2009, the total investment in AIG has been 
almost $120 billion, which includes asset purchases, bridge loans, 
and government stakes in AIG subsidiaries.89 
The banking industry similarly was marked by failures and 
government bailouts. On September 25, 2008, Washington Mutual 
declared bankruptcy and, in a transaction facilitated by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), sold its bank operations 
to JPMorgan Chase.90 On September 28, as Wachovia appeared to 
be on the verge of insolvency, Wachovia began negotiating to be 
purchased by Citigroup, but ultimately closed a deal with Wells 
Fargo.91  
These kinds of bank failures prompted the passage of legislation 
aimed at providing financial assistance to troubled banks, including 
some of the largest. Two such banks receiving significant aid were 
Citigroup and Bank of America. In November 2008, Citigroup, 
which had just received $25 billion in government funds in October 
2008, received an added $20 billion in government funds, and the 
government agreed to guarantee about $306 billion in real estate 
and other loans and securities.92 In exchange, the government 
received $20 billion of preferred stock in Citigroup, and as a fee for 
the guarantee, Citigroup agreed to issue the government an 
 
 86. See id.; Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Statement by the Fed. Reserve 
Bank of N.Y. Regarding AIG Transaction (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.newyorkfed.org/ 
newsevents/news/markets/2008/an080929.html [hereinafter Statement by the Fed. Reserve 
Bank of N.Y. Regarding AIG Transaction].  
 87. Statement by the Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Regarding AIG Transaction, supra note 
86. 
 88. See Barry Meier & Mary Williams Walsh, AIG to Get Additional $37.8 Billion, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at B01. 
 89. See David Goldman, CNNMoney.com’s Bailout Tracker, CNNMONEY.COM, 
http://money.cnn.com/news/storysupplement/economy/bailouttracker.  
 90. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 40, at 41. 
 91. Id. at 42–43. 
 92. Eric Dash, Citigroup to Halt Dividend and Curb Pay, NYTIMES.COM, Nov. 24, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/24/business/24citibank.html. For the Fed press 
release on the Citigroup deal, see http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/ 
bcreg/20081123a.htm.  
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additional $7 billion in preferred shares.93 The loan not only restricts 
the payment of bonuses and certain executive compensation, but also 
requires that Citigroup receive consent before paying dividends over 
one cent per share.94 In February 2009, Citigroup received its third 
government intervention, increasing the government’s stake in the 
company up to thirty-six percent, pursuant to which the 
government’s preferred shares would be converted into common 
shares.95 Thus, instead of injecting cash into the company, the 
government used its position to increase equity in the company.  
Bank of America has received some $45 billion in government 
funds, including an initial $25 billion loan and an additional $20 
billion loan in January 2009.96 In addition, the government has 
agreed to guarantee some $118 billion of its assets.97 The 
government also agreed to absorb certain bank losses in exchange for 
an additional $4 billion of preferred shares.98 The Bank of America 
deal is structured like the Citigroup transaction, with the 
government acquiring an equity position in the bank while imposing 
compensation and governance restrictions on it. The combined loans 
make the government the largest Bank of America shareholder with 
approximately a six percent stake in the company.99  
The collapse of the housing market and turmoil in the financial 
sector has had a devastating impact on the economy, triggering a 
recession both in the United States and abroad. Thus, 2007 and 
2008 have been marked not only by steep drops in the stock market, 
 
 93. See Dash, supra note 92 (describing term sheet). 
 94. Amanda Ruggeri, Citigroup Receives Latest Government Bailout to Protect Troubled 
Lending Market, U.S. NEWS, Nov. 24, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/ 
national/2008/11/24/citigroup-receives-latest-government-bailout-to-protect-troubled-
lending-market.html. The dividend restriction essentially halts dividend payments at Citigroup.  
 95. See David Enrich & Deborah Solomon, Citi, U.S. Reach Accord on a Third Bailout, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2009, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB123573611480193881.html. At the end of July 2009, Citigroup took steps to effectuate 
this conversion of the government’s stake. See Citi Takes Big Step to Giving U.S. 34 Percent 
Stake, REUTERS, July 23, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-CreditCrisis/ 
idUSTRE56M6DM20090723 (describing exchange offer). 
 96. See Eric Dash et al., Bank of America to Receive Additional $20 Billion, 
NYTIMES.COM, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/business/world 
business/16iht-16merrill.19411223.html.  
 97. Id.; see also Press Release, FDIC, Treasury, Fed. Reserve and the FDIC Provide 
Assistance to Bank of Am. (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/ 
pr09004.html. 
 98. Dash, supra note 96. 
 99. Id. 
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but also by heavy job losses. By March 2009, the U.S. 
unemployment rate reached 8.5%, its highest level in over twenty-
five years.100 
As this section reveals, the boom and bust of the housing bubble 
set off a chain reaction in the broader financial and economic sector. 
The next section pinpoints some of the major ways in which the 
government responded to this collapse. 
B. The Government Response 
Broadly speaking, the government responded to the economic 
crisis with a steady drumbeat of legislation aimed at providing 
financial assistance both to specific industries in turmoil and to the 
broader economy. Moreover, as the problem worsened, each new 
piece of legislation and new program appeared to have a broader 
reach and mandate. This section briefly describes some of the most 
critical pieces of legislation. 
1. Early legislative responses 
The first major legislative effort to respond to the crisis was the 
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (the “Stimulus Act”), signed on 
February 13, 2008, by President George H.W. Bush.101 The 
Stimulus Act appropriated some $266 million to provide certain tax 
rebates for individuals to be paid as quickly as possible.102 For 
businesses, the Stimulus Act offered one-time incentives for 
investment in new equipment and write-off of tax losses.103 The 
 
 100. The Associated Press, U.S. Jobless Claims Rise more than Expected, NYTIMES.COM, 
Apr. 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/business/economy/24econ.html. 
 101. See Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613 (Feb. 13, 
2008).  
 102. The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (“ESA”) appropriated $266 million for the 
Department of Treasury to be available until September 30, 2009. See id. § 101(e). The ESA 
allowed a tax rebate in 2008 of an amount equal to the lesser of an individual’s net income tax 
liability or $600 (or $1200 for a joint return) as well as a $300 tax rebate per child. Id. § 101. 
The ESA also allowed at least $300 in tax rebates (or $600 for a joint return) for taxpayers 
who had qualified income of at least $3000, with qualified income defined as earned income, 
social security benefits for seniors and certain veteran’s compensation and pensions. Id. 
Although the rebates placed limits on taxpayers who earn more than $75,000 (or $150,000 for 
joint returns), the rebates applied even to families that earned too little to pay taxes. See id. 
(noting that qualified individuals include taxpayers with income levels of at least $3000). 
 103. The ESA increased the limit up to which a business could expense property 
purchased and placed in service during 2008 to $250,000—its highest level ever and double 
the previous limit of $125,000. See id. § 102. The ESA also provided a special tax depreciation 
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Stimulus Act also increased the maximum mortgage amounts that 
various government agencies could give to potential homebuyers.104 
The plan deliberately did not include long term policy changes such 
as permanent tax cuts. Instead, the tax rebates were designed to 
improve the economy by quickly stimulating consumer and business 
spending. While one study of the Stimulus Act’s impact suggests that 
it did successfully stimulate spending,105 another found no significant 
increase in consumption resulting from the rebates.106  
On July 30, 2008, President Bush passed legislation aimed at 
responding more directly to the housing crisis. The Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (the “Housing Act”) provided 
some $300 billion in housing relief including additional property tax 
deductions, homebuyer tax credits, and development of a refinance 
program for homebuyers with subprime loans.107 The Housing Act 
authorized the Federal Housing Administration (the “FHA”) to 
guarantee up to $300 billion in new 30-year fixed rate mortgages for 
subprime borrowers.108  
2. TARP and economic reinvestment 
As the economy worsened, and it appeared clear that greater 
response was warranted, broader legislation surfaced. On September 
20, 2008, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson submitted a plan (the 
“Paulson Plan”) to create a Troubled Assets Relief Program, or 
“TARP.” The Paulson Plan, less than three pages long, proposed to 
use up to $700 billion to buy mortgage-related assets from any 
financial firm headquartered in the United States.109 The purpose of 
 
allowance for certain property acquired and placed in service during the 2008 calendar year. See 
id.  
 104. In an effort to provide liquidity to the housing markets and continue to encourage 
the securitization of mortgages, the ESA temporarily increased loan limits eligible for purchase 
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Id. § 201. 
 105. See Christina Broda and Jonathan A. Parker, The Impact of the 2008 Rebate, 
VOXEU, Aug. 15, 2008, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1541. 
 106. Taylor notes that there was no statistically significant increase in consumption as a 
result of the rebate because most people saved their funds and did not spend their rebate 
checks. See Taylor, supra note 45, at 12–13. 
 107. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 
2654 (2008). 
 108. See id. § 257. 
 109. See Text of Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan, NYTIMES.COM, Sept. 20, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/21draftcnd.html?ref=business [hereinafter 
Draft of Paulson Plan]. 
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the Paulson Plan was to improve the liquidity and financial condition 
of entities hampered by mortgage-related assets by removing such 
assets from their balance sheets. The House generated an expanded 
version of the Paulson Plan, now 110 pages, and submitted it for 
vote on September 29.110 Although supporters of the expanded bill 
insisted that a significant bailout was necessary to avoid a collapse of 
the financial and economic system, concerns about government 
intervention in the financial markets and the overall efficacy of the 
Paulson Plan ultimately led the House to vote it down.111 The 
rejection was followed by a 778 point drop in the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average, the largest single-day point drop ever.112  
Ultimately, on October 3, 2008, Congress enacted a revised plan 
(now 451 pages), called the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
of 2008 (the “Stabilization Act”).113 The Stabilization Act 
established the $700 billion TARP; however, it included more details 
and oversight than that proposed under the original Paulson Plan 
and the rejected House bill. The Stabilization Act granted broad 
authority to the Treasury Secretary to purchase “troubled assets”—
mortgages, securities, or other instruments based on or related to 
such mortgages—and to develop policies and procedures related to 
that purchase.114 TARP funding was approved on a graduated basis, 
such that $250 billion would be immediately available and an 
additional $100 billion would be released when the President 
submitted a request to Congress certifying that such funds were 
necessary.115 However, while the President could submit a similar 
request for the final $350 billion, Congress could deny the request 
through a joint resolution of disapproval.116 On January 12, 2009, at 
 
 110. See Jonathan Weisman, House Rejects Financial Rescue, Sending Stocks Plummeting, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2008, at A01; Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, House Rejects 
Bailout Package, 228–205; Stocks Plunge, NYTimes.com, Sept. 29, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/business/30bailout.html.  
 111. See Hulse & Herszenhorn, supra note 110. 
 112. Alexandra Twin, Stocks Crushed: Approximately $1.2 Trillion in Market Value is Gone 
After House Rejects the $700 Billion Bank Bailout Plan, CNNMoney.com, Sept. 29, 2008, 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/29/markets/markets_newyork/index.htm?postversion=20
08092918.  
 113. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 
(2008). The Stabilization Act also temporarily raised the FDIC insurance limits to $250,000. 
See id. § 136. 
 114. See id. § 101. 
 115. See id. § 115. 
 116. See id. 
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the request of President-Elect Barack Obama, President Bush 
requested the final $350 billion of TARP funds.117  
Under the Stabilization Act, those who received TARP funds 
also became subject to certain executive compensation and corporate 
governance provisions. As an initial matter, a company receiving 
TARP funding must grant the government a warrant to receive stock 
or debt in the company—effectively enabling the government to take 
an equity interest in all of the companies to which it distributes 
TARP funds.118 The Stabilization Act also allowed the Treasury 
Secretary to require companies to meet executive compensation and 
corporate governance standards for the duration of the period in 
which loans were outstanding. Thus, companies must impose limits 
on compensation to exclude incentives for senior executives (the top 
five most highly compensated executives) to take “unnecessary and 
excessive risks.”119 Companies also must provide for a “claw-back” or 
recovery of bonuses or other incentive-based compensation paid to a 
senior executive officer based on earnings or other criteria later 
proven to be materially inaccurate.120 Moreover, companies are 
required to prohibit golden parachute payments to the senior 
executive officer, i.e., payments made at the executive’s departure 
from the company for any reason, other than payments for services 
or benefits already accrued.121 Notably, the Stabilization Act 
contained a grandfather clause for compensation payments made 
pursuant to a valid employment contract executed on or before the 
Stabilization Act’s enactment.122 When AIG, which had received 
some $170 billion in financial assistance under TARP and other 
plans, paid large bonuses to their executives,123 the grandfather 
 
 117. Holly Rosenkrantz, Obama Asks Bush to Seek TARP Funds From Congress, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 12, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601110 
&sid=aik5Wv_K3na8. 
 118. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 113(d), Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 
Stat. 3765 (2008). 
 119. Id. § 111(a). 
 120. Id. § 111. Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. Law. No. 107-204, 
116 Stat. 745, also has a claw-back provision, but it is more limited, as it only applies to the 
CEO or CFO of public companies, is based solely on a financial report, and has a limited 
recovery period. 
 121. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111(b)(2)(C), Pub. L. No. 110-343, 
122 Stat. 3765 (2008). 
 122. Id. § 111(d). 
 123. David Cho & Brady Dennis, Bailout King AIG Still to Pay Millions in Bonuses; 
Geithner Gets Firm to Make Revisions, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2009, at A01; Edmund L. 
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clause was heavily criticized.124 Finally, the Stabilization Act 
prohibited companies that received TARP assistance in excess of 
$300 million from taking a deduction for federal income tax 
purposes for compensation above $500,000.125 
Pursuant to the newly enacted Stabilization Act, on October 28, 
2008, the Treasury Department purchased $125 billion in preferred 
stock from nine banks that had previously agreed to subscribe to the 
TARP facility.126 Five of the banks have repaid the Treasury 
Department, leaving $65 billion unpaid.127 By July 2009, the 
Treasury Department had deployed $200 billion in financial 
assistance to hundreds of banks.128 Only about $70 billion of these 
funds have been repaid.129 
On February 4, 2009, the Treasury Department announced 
additional restrictions on executive compensation for TARP 
recipients (the “Treasury Guidelines”).130 The Treasury Guidelines 
drew a distinction between firms receiving funds through a 
“generally available capital access program,” which refers to 
programs having the same terms for all recipients, and firms that 
 
Andrews & Peter Baker, A.I.G. Planning Huge Bonuses After $170 Billion Bailout, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, at A01, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ 
03/15/business/15AIG.html. AIG planned to pay some $165 million in bonuses. A few days 
later, the House approved a 90% tax on the bonuses as well as bonuses paid by any firms 
receiving significant sums of bailout money. Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, House 
Approves 90% Tax on Bonuses After Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at A01, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/business/20bailout.html.  
 124. See, e.g., Dodd: Administration Pushed for Language Protecting Bonuses, 
CNNPolitics.com, Mar. 19, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/18/ 
aig.bonuses.congress/.  
 125. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, § 302(a)(5)(A)(i), Pub. L. No. 110-343, 
122 Stat. 3765 (2008). 
 126. U.S. Gov’t Accounting Office, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Capital Purchase 
Program Transactions for October 28, 2008, through May 29, 2009, and Information on 
Financial Agency Agreements, Contracts, Blanket Purchase Agreements, and Interagency 
Agreements Awarded as of June 1, 2009 (GAO-09-707SP, June 2009), an E-Supplement to 
GAO-09-658, http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/gao-09-707sp/; Bailed Out Banks: The 
Treasury Department Has Invested About $200 Billion in Hundreds of Banks Through Its 
Capital Purchase Program in an Effort to Prop Up Capital and Support New Lending, 
CNNMONEY.COM, http://money.cnn.com/news/specials/storysupplement/bankbailout/ 
[hereinafter Bailed Out Banks]. 
 127. See Bailed Out Banks, supra note 26. 
 128. For a list of all banks that have received funds as of July 2009, see id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions on 
Executive Compensation, (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg15.htm. 
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require “exceptional assistance,” and hence have specific negotiated 
agreements with the Treasury.131 Examples of firms that fall under 
this exceptional assistance definition include AIG, Bank of America, 
and Citigroup. For firms receiving exceptional assistance, the new 
restrictions limited total annual compensation for senior executives 
to $500,000, other than restricted stock, which stock cannot vest 
until the government has been repaid with interest.132 In addition, 
companies receiving TARP funds must have a “say on pay” vote 
from their shareholders—a non-binding vote on executive 
compensation.133 The restrictions also expanded the number of 
employees subject to executive compensation limits. Hence, the once 
modest claw-back provision was expanded to encompass not just the 
top five senior executives, but the next twenty senior executives if 
they knowingly engaged in providing inaccurate information.134 
Similarly, the Stabilization Act’s golden parachute prohibition was 
extended to the top ten senior executives, while providing that at 
least the next twenty-five executives would be prohibited from 
receiving golden parachutes in excess of one year’s compensation.135  
For firms participating in generally available capital access 
programs, the Treasury Department announced its intention to 
propose similar executive compensation rules for public comment.136 
While such rules were similar to those for firms with exceptional 
assistance, they were either less restrictive or applied to fewer 
executives.137 These Treasury Guidelines reflected President Obama’s 
efforts to “promote systemic regulatory reform” by ensuring that 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. The Treasury Department also proposed that companies not receiving 
exceptional financial assistance be subject to this limitation unless it was waived by a vote of 
fully informed shareholders. The ESA already had made compensation in excess of $500,000 
less attractive for companies by requiring that certain TARP recipients forgo any deduction for 
compensation for federal income tax purposes in excess of that amount. Hence, the Treasury 
Guidelines expand upon this requirement. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. For example, with respect to golden parachutes, the ban would apply to the top five 
senior executives as opposed to ten. Moreover, instead of a complete prohibition on such 
parachutes, executives in companies receiving general assistance would be restricted to 
receiving a golden parachute that was no greater than one year’s annual compensation. See id. 
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governance and compensation rules better promoted long-term 
value and growth.138 
On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the “Reinvestment Act”), 
a $787 billion economic stimulus plan.139 Similar to the 2008 
Stimulus Act, the Reinvestment Act provided tax relief for 
individuals and small businesses.140 However, the Reinvestment Act 
sweeps more broadly than tax relief by expanding unemployment 
and social welfare benefits while providing aid for education, health 
care, infrastructure, and energy.  
The Reinvestment Act also amended the Stabilization Act to 
broaden the limits on executive compensation by providing more 
comprehensive provisions.141 Although the Reinvestment Act 
adopted many of the restrictions articulated in the Treasury 
Guidelines, there were some differences between the two. Instead of 
limiting the rules to companies receiving exceptional assistance, the 
Reinvestment Act generally imposed such restrictions on all TARP 
recipients.142 For example, the Reinvestment Act required that all 
companies receiving TARP funds have a shareholder “say on pay” 
vote.143 The Reinvestment Act mirrored the Treasury Guidelines’ 
claw-back provision for the top five senior executives and the next 
top twenty most highly compensated executives.144 However, unlike 
the Treasury Guidelines, the Reinvestment Act’s claw-back applied 
to such executives regardless of their knowledge of material 
inaccuracies on which their bonuses or other awards was based.145 
With respect to golden parachute payments, the Reinvestment Act 
tracked the Treasury Guidelines’ expansion of the prohibition to a 
senior executive or any of the next five most highly compensated 
employees, but made no provision for any other executives.146 The 
Reinvestment Act also did not incorporate the $500,000 annual 
compensation limit, but it did subject all TARP recipients to the 
 
 138. See id. 
 139. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, 123 Stat. 
115. 
 140. See id. §§ 1001–04, 1211–12. 
 141. See id. § 7001. 
 142. See id. 
 143. Id. § 7001(e)(1). 
 144. See id. § 7001(b)(3)(B). 
 145. Id. § 7001(b)(3)(B). 
 146. See id. § 7001(b)(C). 
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provision requiring that executive compensation over $500,000 
cannot be deducted for federal income tax purposes.147 The 
Reinvestment Act also prohibited all bonuses other than long term 
restricted stock, although the number of employees prohibited from 
receiving a bonus depended upon the amount of financial 
assistance.148  
In addition to the restrictions that tracked, at least to some 
extent, the Treasury Guidelines, the Reinvestment Act imposed 
further requirements. TARP recipients must have a company-wide 
policy on approval for excessive or luxury expenditures.149 Further, 
TARP recipients must establish a compensation committee of the 
board comprised entirely of independent directors who, among 
other things, generate compensation plans that exclude incentives for 
unnecessary and excessive risk taking.150 The Reinvestment Act also 
requires the CEO and CFO to certify in writing their compliance 
with these new provisions in its annual SEC filings or to the Treasury 
Secretary in the case of non-public companies.151 
Finally, the Reinvestment Act directed the Treasury Secretary to 
review bonuses, retention awards, and other compensation paid to 
senior executive officers and the next twenty most highly 
compensated employees to determine if they were inconsistent with 
revised compensation provisions, TARP, or the public interest.152 If 
such a determination is made, the Reinvestment Act directs the 
Treasury to negotiate with the TARP recipient and employee for 
appropriate reimbursements.153  
In June 2009, the Treasury Department reconciled the 
discrepancies between the Reinvestment Act and Treasury Guidelines 
by issuing rules implementing the executive compensation provisions 
of the Reinvestment Act (the “Executive Compensation Rules”).154 
These Executive Compensation Rules consolidated and superseded 
 
 147. Id. § 7001(b)(1)(B) (incorporating the deduction prohibitions set forth in I.R.C. § 
162(m)(5) where applicable).  
 148. Id. § 7001(b)(3)(D)(i). 
 149. See id. § 7001(d). 
 150. Id. § 7001(c)(2). 
 151. Id. § 7001(b)(4). 
 152. Id. § 7001(f)(1). 
 153. Id. § 7001(f)(2). 
 154. See TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. 
28,394 (Jun. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 30), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/ec%20ifr%20fr%20web% 206.9.09tg164.pdf.  
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all the previous rules and guidance regarding executive 
compensation. 155 These rules essentially implemented the provisions 
of the Reinvestment Act, while drawing some distinctions with 
respect to the manner in which the provisions would be applied 
based on the amount of financial assistance being granted to 
particular TARP recipients.156 The Executive Compensation Rules 
went beyond the provisions in the Reinvestment Act in some areas 
by, for example, requiring additional disclosures related to 
compensation matters.157 Like the Reinvestment Act, the Executive 
Compensation Rules abandoned the $500,000 salary cap while 
maintaining the exclusion for tax deductions over such amount.158 
The Rules maintain the grandfather clause for bonuses made 
pursuant to a valid employment contract and even extended the 
grandfathered period to agreements made on or before February 11, 
2009.159 The Executive Compensation Rules also appointed a special 
master for TARP Executive Compensation who has responsibility for 
interpreting the executive compensation and governance provisions 
under TARP.160 
As the foregoing suggests, the government’s response to the 
crisis consisted primarily of legislation providing for increased levels 
of support and intervention. 
3. Some key initiatives from the Federal Reserve 
The Fed initially responded to the crisis by lowering interest 
rates. In September 2007, the Fed made its first in a series of interest 
 
 155. TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. at 
28,396. 
 156. See Sullivan & Cromwell, Strict New Executive Compensation Standards Under 
TARP, Feb. 5, 2009, http://www.sullcrom.com/files/Publication/b6b306e9-66cc-4e7a-
8424-12ed3206f273/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ec4d87cb-6f07-4e1b-9f06-
770f8bc4b992/SC_Publication_Strict_New_Executive_Compensation_Standards_Under_TA
RP.pdf.  
 157. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Interim Final Rule on TARP 
Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance (Jun. 10, 2009), http://www. 
ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg165.htm.  
 158. See TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. at 
28,396. Presumably, the cap still applies to companies that have already agreed to such 
restriction. Moreover, the Treasury Department still has the ability to demand such a cap in 
future negotiations with companies needing exceptional assistance. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 28,397. 
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rate cuts.161 The rate cuts were designed to “forestall some of the 
adverse effects” of the tightening credit market.162 Thus, the Fed 
continued its rate cuts as the economy weakened in an effort to 
counteract the deteriorating conditions in the market. 163 The Fed 
also participated in coordinate rate cuts, such as the one in October 
2008 with the central banks of the European Union, Britain, China, 
Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland.164 By December 2008, the Fed 
established a target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 0.25%, 
while lowering the discount rate to 0.5%.165 
In addition to these interest rate cuts, the Fed instituted various 
formal and informal financial assistance programs aimed at 
stimulating the economy and revitalizing particular companies. As 
Part III.B reveals, the Fed played an instrumental role in assisting 
several financial institutions. Moreover, the Fed instituted various 
funding facilities including two aimed at directly at benefiting 
consumers and struggling businesses. Thus, on October 6, 2008, the 
Fed responded to the growing deterioration in the commercial paper 
market by establishing a Commercial Paper Funding Facility, which 
 
 161. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 18, 2007), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20070918a.htm. On September 
18, the Fed lowered its target rate fifty basis points to 4.75% and lowered the discount rate fifty 
basis points to 5.25%. 
 162. Id. 
 163. In October, both the target rate and the discount rate were lowered to 4.5% and 5% 
respectively. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 31, 2007), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20071031a.htm. In January, 
the rate was lowered seventy-five basis points to 3.5% for the target rate and 4% for the 
discount rate, noting that market conditions had continued to deteriorate along with further 
tightening of the credit market. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Jan. 
22, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080122b.htm. 
Eight days later, the Fed lowered the target and discount rates again to 3% and 3.5% 
respectively. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Jan. 30, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080130a.htm.  
 164. This action brought the federal funds rate to 1.5% and the discount rate to 1.75%. 
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 8, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081008a.htm. The interest 
rate was lowered again on October 29, 2008, to 1% and 1.25%. Press Release, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 29, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/monetary/20081029a.htm.  
 165. On December 16, 2008, the rate was again lowered to a target range for the federal 
funds rate of 0 to .25% and a discount rate of .5%. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys. (Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/ 
monetary/20081216b.htm. 
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would purchase short-term loans (commercial paper) from banks.166 
The Facility aimed to provide liquidity to the commercial paper 
market, thereby seeking to provide vital assistance to the many 
companies that used commercial paper to finance their day-to-day 
operations.167 On November 25, 2008, the Fed created the Term 
Asset–Backed Loan Facility (“TALF”) to lend up to $200 billion to 
support consumer loan-backed securities with the aim of reviving the 
securitization market for consumer loans such as student loans, 
credit cards, and auto loans.168 This market had virtually halted by 
the second half of 2008.169 Eventually, available funds under TALF 
were expanded to $1 trillion, and TALF was expanded to cover 
additional assets including commercial and residential leases.170 These 
more formal programs were in addition to periodic loans provided to 
various companies. 
4. The automaker bailout 
In mid-November 2008, representatives from the “Big Three” 
automakers—General Motors (“GM”), Ford Motor Co. (“Ford”), 
and Chrysler LLC (“Chrysler”)—met with lawmakers to discuss their 
dire financial condition and testified before Congress requesting 
financial aid.171 GM, whose shares plunged to a six-decade low, 
warned that it was almost out of cash and without aid it would likely 
declare bankruptcy by year’s end.172 The automakers faced 
 
 166. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 7, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081007c.htm. The Facility 
funds a special purpose vehicle that purchases three-month unsecured and asset-based 
commercial paper. The Facility became effective on October 27, 2008. 
 167. See id. 
 168. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Nov. 25, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125a.htm.  
 169. Adam B. Ashcraft et al., The Term Asset-Backed Securities Lending Facility (Mar. 
17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1361712. 
 170. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Feb. 10, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20090210b.htm.  
 171. The CEOs flew to Washington on private jets, spurring significant criticism and 
outrage. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Auto Execs Fly Corporate Jets to D.C., Tin Cups in Hand, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2008, at A03 (quoting Rep. Gary Ackerman as saying, “There’s a 
delicious irony in seeing private luxury jets flying into Washington, D.C., and people coming 
off of them with tin cups in their hands.”). When they came again to Washington asking for 
funds, the CEOs flew commercial. 
 172. Chris Isidore, GM: Almost Out of Cash, CNNMONEY.COM, Nov. 7, 2008, http:// 
money.cnn.com/2008/11/07/news/companies/gm/index.htm [hereinafter Isidore, GM: 
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opposition not only from those who balked at giving money to a 
sector deemed to be poorly managed, but also from those who 
believed that TARP funds should be used only to assist the financial 
sector.173 In addition, Congress was reluctant to institute another 
bailout on the heels of the recently enacted Stabilization Act. 
However, after considerable negotiation, a $25 billion auto-bailout 
bill was introduced in the House, entitled the Auto Industry 
Financing and Restructuring Act, which pulled funds from the $700 
billion TARP funds (the “Initial Auto Bill”).174 The Initial Auto Bill 
enabled the president to designate an executive, dubbed by many as 
an “auto czar,” to administer the funds and oversee the plan.175 
Similar to provisions regarding TARP funds, the bill required the 
government to take warrants for an equity interest in the 
automakers. The equity taken would likely have ensured that the 
government owned a majority stake in all three automakers. The Bill 
also included executive compensation limits similar to TARP such as 
restrictions on bonuses to the top twenty-five highest paid officers 
and bans on golden parachutes. 
Concerns regarding the size of the Bill and reliance on TARP 
funds led the House to abandon it in favor of a revised bill (the 
“Revised Bill”) that cut the aid to $14 billion and, instead of TARP 
funds, drew on funds previously appropriated under the Energy 
Independence and Security Act—a source that many Democrats 
were reluctant to tap because it was designated for enhancing fuel-
efficient vehicles.176 The Revised Bill required automakers to issue 
warrants to the government equal to twenty percent of the loan 
amount in exchange for loans.177 The Revised Bill also contained 
restrictions on executive compensation similar to TARP and 
 
Almost Out of Cash]; Chris Isidore, GM: Bailout Push Can’t Halt Stock Slide, 
CNNMONEY.COM, Nov. 10, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/11/10/news/companies 
/gm_stock/index.htm [hereinafter Isidore, GM: Bailout Push].  
 173. See Isidore, GM: Almost Out of Cash, supra note 172; Isidore, GM: Bailout Push, 
supra note 172.  
 174. Senate to Take Up Auto Bailout Bill on Monday, MSNBC.COM, Nov. 14, 2008, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27718233/ns/business-autos//. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Auto Industry Financing and Restructuring Act, H.R. 7321, 110th Cong. § 
10(a)(1) (2007). 
 177. Id. § 12(a)(2)(A); Peter Valdes-Dapena, Auto Bailout ABCs, CNNMONEY.COM, 
Dec. 11, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/11/autos/auto_bailout_outline/index. 
htm?cnn=yes.  
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prohibited dividend payments during the period when an automaker 
was receiving financial assistance.178 Moreover, each automaker 
would have to submit a restructuring plan detailing its proposal for 
achieving long-term viability.179 The Revised Bill retained the auto-
czar, and gave the czar the ability to review and prohibit any 
transactions valued in excess of $100 million.180 Although the 
Revised Bill passed the House on December 10, it died in the Senate 
one day later.181  
The Revised Bill’s death in the Senate compelled President Bush 
to provide automakers with a lifeline. Based on the belief that such a 
lifeline was necessary to prevent the collapse of the American auto 
industry, on December 19, 2008, President Bush announced a plan 
(the “Auto Plan”) pursuant to which he would use funds from 
TARP to provide an emergency loan of up to $13.4 billion for GM 
and $4 billion for Chrysler.182 In most respects the Auto Plan 
mirrored the Revised Bill. For example, the Auto Plan continued to 
require that automakers produce a long-term plan for their 
profitability by March 31, 2009.183 The Auto Plan also included 
limits on executive pay, bans on golden parachutes, and provisions 
requiring companies to sell their corporate jets.184 Moreover the 
Auto Plan required that companies reach an agreement with the 
unions on wage and benefit cuts.185 Since the plan’s implementation, 
while Ford has not taken any money pursuant to the Auto Plan, GM 
and Chrysler automakers have received some $80 billion in financial 
assistance.186  
Despite significant federal assistance, both Chrysler and GM 
ultimately declared bankruptcy. On April 30, 2009, the government 
essentially forced Chrysler to file for bankruptcy protection so that it 
could pursue a transaction with a foreign automaker, in what the 
New York Times referred to as “yet another extraordinary 
 
 178. Valdes-Dapena, supra note 177.  
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Auto Bailout Dies in Senate, CNN.COM, Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2008/US/12/11/auto.bailout/index.html.  
 182. David E. Sanger et al., Bush Aids Detroit, but Hard Choices Wait for Obama, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008, at A01. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Goldman, supra note 89. 
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intervention into private industry by the federal government.”187 On 
June 1, 2009, GM declared bankruptcy in one of the largest 
bankruptcies in history.188 When GM emerged from bankruptcy on 
July 10, 2009, the government owned sixty percent of its stock as a 
result of its financial assistance.189 
C. Concluding Assessments 
The foregoing discussion makes clear that the financial crisis 
prompted an unprecedented response from the government. The 
legal origins theory purports to predict how countries respond to 
legal problems and crises based on their legal origins. In order to test 
the saliency of this theory, the next section seeks to examine whether 
America’s crisis response can be viewed as consistent with its legal 
origins. 
IV. A THEORY THROUGH THE PRISM OF CRISIS 
A. The Wrong Tool Kit? 
Even a casual examination of the government’s actions during 
the crisis strongly suggests that many of the ways in which the 
United States has responded to the crisis contradict its legal tradition 
and instead resemble what one would consider a civil law response. 
This Section will describe the manner in which America’s response to 
the crisis appears to run counter to its legal roots.  
1. Over-reliance on legislation 
As an initial matter, the very fact that the United States response 
has been dominated by legislative action, and in some cases executive 
action, poses problems for the legal origins theory. As the United 
States’ legal origins are rooted in the common law tradition, the 
legal origins theory suggests that the United States response will 
emphasize judicial rulemaking over legislative response to social or 
 
 187. Jim Rutenberg & Bill Vlasic, Chrysler Files to Seek Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 1, 2009, at A01. 
 188. Bill Vlasic & Nick Bunkley, Obama is Upbeat for G.M.’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 
2009, at A01; Peter Whoriskey, GM Emerges From Bankruptcy After Landmark Government 
Bailout, WASH. POST, July 10, 2009, at A1. 
 189. Whoriskey, supra note 188.  
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economic problems.190 In stark contrast to this prediction, however, 
the United States response has been marked by a series of far-
reaching legislative and executive actions. This includes three major 
stimulus plans, comprising more than $1.7 trillion in government 
spending.191 In addition to a general stimulus, Congress also enacted 
a housing bill with a $300 billion price tag.192 With the enactment of 
the commercial paper facility and TALF, the Fed also seemed to 
embrace a legislative oriented response to the crisis. Furthermore, 
the fact that there were two, albeit unsuccessful, efforts to enact 
legislation directed at revitalizing the auto industry underscores the 
tendency to rely on legislative solutions to the problems created by 
the crisis. While we ultimately abandoned these legislative initiatives, 
they were replaced not by judicial rulemaking, but by executive 
actions. Since such actions essentially mirrored those embodied in 
the abandoned legislation, they could be viewed as tantamount to a 
legislative response, again appearing to reflect a preference for 
legislative solutions during this current crisis. This legislative 
preference is incompatible with the legal origins theory’s emphasis 
on the common law tradition of de-emphasizing reliance on 
legislation.  
In addition to the Auto Plan, we have seen a series of executive 
actions, such as those related to executive compensation, that closely 
resemble legislative initiatives and thus evidence an apparent reliance 
on legislation as the more appropriate response to severe economic 
problems. Given the extent of the credit and financial crisis, this 
flurry of legislative activity may not be surprising. Indeed, it may be 
that during times of crisis it is difficult to look to courts because of 
their inability to respond quickly in shaping the progression of law. 
Moreover, even legal origins theorists acknowledge that countries 
may have a mix of common law and civil law strategies.193 However, 
those theorists also predict that a country’s legal origins will dictate 
which strategies dominate. In this respect, because the United States 
response has relied heavily and extensively on legislative and 
executive action, it poses problems for the legal origins theory 
 
 190. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 308, 310. 
 191. See supra Parts III.B.1–2 (discussing the 2008 Stimulus Act, the 2008 Stabilization 
Act, and the 2009 Reinvestment Act). 
 192. See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text.  
 193. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 309. 
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because that theory emphasizes America’s reliance on judicial 
rulemaking for problem solving.  
As will be expounded below, this increased reliance on legislation 
represents a familiar criticism of the legal origins theory: many 
common law nations increasingly have come to rely on legislation in 
a manner seemingly inconsistent with a supposed orientation 
towards judicial rule making.194 The government’s response to the 
current crisis echoes and appears to support those criticisms. This 
criticism seems especially potent in the context of the current crisis 
because of the significant reliance on legislation as a crisis response. 
Importantly, the breadth of America’s dependence on legislation 
suggests that, at least during this crisis, the United States has moved 
quite dramatically away from a common law response and by so 
doing has strayed significantly from its legal origins.  
To be sure, this reliance may be explained by political changes 
since both the White House and Congress changed political 
affiliations during the crisis. Of course, while the Obama 
administration has enacted legislation since its tenure, the Bush 
administration’s legislative responses outpace those of President 
Obama’s administration. The Bush administration was responsible 
for enacting three major housing and stimulus packages as well as the 
Auto Plan and a host of initiatives from the Fed. However, political 
changes may do little to explain the heavy reliance on legislation 
since that reliance appeared to remain constant despite those 
changes195 
In derogation of the legal origins theory, it would appear that 
the economic climate and severity of the crisis explains not only the 
relatively unprecedented reliance on legislation, but also the shift 
away from America’s common law traditions. If this observation is 
accurate, it indicates that economics rather than legal origins better 
predicts America’s response to social and economic problems, while 
at the very least suggesting that legal origins may be less relevant in 
the context of this current economic turmoil.  
 
 194. See id. at 310. 
 195. To be sure, it may be that the nature of the legislation changed with the change in 
political parties. 
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2. An emergent administrative and executive state 
The legal origins theory indicates that reliance on administrative 
power is the hallmark of the civil law system. However, the United 
States response has not only heavily relied on administrators and 
regulators, but has also spurred the growth of administrative power.  
Since the inception of the crisis, the government’s response has 
relied quite heavily on the Fed, placing increased discretion and 
authority in the hands of a single administrator. The Fed is an 
independent government body that oversees the nation’s monetary 
policy and seeks to maintain the stability of the financial system. 
Consistent with that role, the Fed was on the front lines in setting 
monetary policy in response to the crisis and instituting programs 
aimed at stimulating the economy. However, the Fed’s authority and 
responsibility increased as the crisis worsened. Fed Chairman 
Bernanke facilitated or orchestrated many of the initial bailouts, 
including those involving Bear Stearns, AIG, and Merrill Lynch.196 
The Fed Chairman also was intimately involved with structuring deal 
terms for these transactions in a manner that was both 
unprecedented and at odds with a common law tradition. Although 
the crisis may have necessitated the Fed’s actions, and even made 
such actions predictable at some level, that predictability does not 
seem attributable to legal origins. As a result, those actions seem to 
undercut the force of the legal origins theory in the context of crisis. 
The increased role and power of the Fed coincided with a 
heightened role for the Treasury Secretary. Like the Fed, the 
Treasury Secretary played an increasingly significant role in 
structuring bailout deals and setting financial policy. In this role, the 
Treasury was on the forefront of announcing corporate governance 
and executive compensation guidelines.197 Notably, the Treasury 
Secretary developed the TARP concept, and hence the primary 
stimulus legislation responsible for more than $1 trillion in 
government expenditure can be traced directly to the Treasury’s 
heightened involvement in the crisis.198 Consistent with the 
expansion of the Treasury Secretary’s role during the financial crisis, 
the Stabilization Act vests significant control and discretion in the 
 
 196. Davidoff and Zaring, supra note 40, at 3. 
 197. See supra notes 126–34, 141, 168 and accompanying text. 
 198. See Rosenkrantz, supra note 117 (describing the original Paulson Plan upon which 
the Stabilization Act and Recovery Act were based). 
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Treasury Secretary to implement the TARP funding program, 
purchase and manage assets, and give guidance on foreclosure 
efforts.199  
Interestingly, most of America’s legislative actions create a host 
of administrators and regulators, appearing to further enhance its 
reliance on administrative power. The Stabilization Act provides for 
some eight different regulators or oversight boards with some 
responsibility to oversee TARP.200 In fact, the Act provides for four 
bodies with some oversight role: the Office of Financial Stability, the 
Financial Stability Oversight Board, the Credit Review Committee, 
and the Congressional Oversight Panel.201 The Act also directs the 
Comptroller General to provide ongoing oversight of TARP and 
monitor the performance of the TARP program.202 The Stabilization 
Act also creates the Office of the Special Inspector for TARP who 
must audit and investigate the activities of Treasury in connection 
with TARP.203 Additionally, the Reinvestment Act as implemented 
by the Treasury appoints a special master to help implement TARP’s 
executive compensation and governance standards.204 As Professors 
Steve Davidoff and David Zaring emphasize, Treasury Secretary 
Paulson and Fed Chair Bernanke appeared to be the unspoken 
leaders of the unparalleled government intervention in the 
economy.205 While many may dispute the appropriateness of their 
actions, most would likely concur that the fact that they wielded 
such authority does not align with a common law tradition. 
Beyond the administration of TARP, the initial and revised auto 
bills contemplated the creation of a so-called “auto czar,” a 
 
 199. See Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613, § 101 (2008). 
 200. This includes the Treasury Secretary, Assistant Treasury Secretary, the Office of 
Financial Stability, the Financial Stability Oversight Board, the Credit Review Committee, the 
Comptroller General, the Inspector General, and the Congressional Oversight Panel. 
 201. The Congressional Oversight Panel consists of five members, one chosen by each of 
the Speaker of the House, the House minority leader, the Senate majority leader, the Senate 
minority leader, and both the Speaker of the House and Senate majority leader after 
consultation with the minority leaders. See Economic Stimulus Act § 125. The Financial 
Stability Oversight Board consists of the Chairman of the Fed, the Treasury Secretary, the 
Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the SEC Chair, and the Secretary of HUD. 
See id. § 104.  
 202. Id. § 116.  
 203. Id. § 121.  
 204. TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 31 C.F.R. § 
30.11(a) (2009). 
 205. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 40, at 3. 
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contemplation that dramatically diverges from its common law 
tradition. Even though President Bush’s Auto Plan rejected the 
concept of an “auto czar”, his plan nonetheless vests discretion in 
the Treasury Secretary to implement the plan and hence continues to 
embrace a reliance on regulators. To be sure, the proliferation of 
legislation almost demands an increased reliance on administrators to 
ensure the proper administration of the various programs 
encompassed in the legislation. Such reliance reflects an inevitable 
outgrowth of the shift towards enhanced legislation. Yet, just like 
that shift, the over-reliance on these agents is not consistent with 
America’s legal origins, and thus cannot be explained by those 
origins.  
3. Government intervention and the ideology of crisis legislation 
Several scholars have criticized the legal origins theory because of 
the growing importance of legislation and administrative power over 
judicial rule-making.206 The architects of the theory call this criticism 
unwarranted, contending that the theory is nevertheless still salient 
most importantly because even when common law nations adopt 
legislative responses, those responses will express “the common law 
way of doing things.”207 According to legal origins theorists, there is 
a guiding ideology or “tool kit” germane to each legal system, and 
legislation enacted under particular systems will embrace tools from 
their appropriate kit.208 In other words, the legislation will reflect 
America’s common law ideologies. However, this prediction is not 
borne out by the examination of legislation passed in response to the 
financial crisis. In effect, the legislation enacted in response to the 
crisis fails to express a common law ideology, but rather borrows 
tools from the civil law kit. 
Perhaps most problematic for proponents of the legal origins 
theory are legislative efforts seemingly aimed at controlling banks. 
The quintessential hallmark of a civil law system—and thus one of its 
primary tools—is control of the banking system.209 Despite the 
United States’ common law tradition, one of the primary and earliest 
legislative and regulatory responses to the crisis was exchanging 
 
 206. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 290–91. 
 207. Id.  
 208. See id. at 307–09. 
 209. See id. at 294. 
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capital for equity in banks, thereby granting the government a stake 
in such entities. Under TARP, the government has injected over 
$200 billion into the U.S. banking system, and such injection has 
been coupled with the government taking an equity position in 
hundreds of banks.210 Some scholars maintain that the government’s 
initial outlay of $125 billion to the nation’s nine largest financial 
institutions in return for equity represents “a partial nationalization 
which the United States had never seen before.”211 Still others have 
referred to the government’s efforts on behalf of the banking 
industry as “shadow nationalization.”212 This is because the 
government has managed to take significant stakes in some 
companies. For example, the government is the largest shareholder 
at Bank of America, and one expert has argued that the 
government’s latest transaction with Citigroup “covers up the 
underlying reality that the government is already essentially the 
majority shareholder in Citigroup.”213 These actions significantly 
undermine the credibility of the legal origins theory in the context of 
the current crisis.214 Even beyond equity positions, the U.S. 
government has implemented other strategies that increase its 
control over bank activities. Some of its transactions impose 
restrictions on divided payments to shareholders, and others regulate 
executive compensation by prohibiting golden parachutes, restricting 
executive salary, and even mandating “say on pay” votes for 
shareholders.215 In addition to the reports and disclosures required 
for TARP recipients, in February 2009, new Treasury Secretary 
 
 210. See supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text.  
 211. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 40, at 3. 
 212. Edmund L. Andrews, Rescue of Banks Hints at Nationalization, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan.16, 2009, at B1 (quoting a managing partner at Federal Financial Analytics). 
 213. Id. (quoting a managing partner at Institutional Risk Analytics). 
 214. Ironically, one of the first countries to exchange government funding for equity in 
banks was England—the “mother” of the common law approach. Moreover, Britain 
nationalized one of its banks as early as February 2008, a decision wholly at odds with the 
common law tradition that shuns such control over the banking industry. See supra note 76; 
David Jolly, In Europe, a Stronger Push to Oversee Banks, NYTIMES.COM, Jan. 20, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/business/worldbusiness/20ukbanks.html?fta=y. 
Britain’s actions further undermine the credibility of the legal origins theory in the context of 
the current crisis. Indeed, if that theory cannot be used to explain the behavior of common 
law’s mother, then surely it cannot be used to predict the actions of her children. 
 215. See supra notes 131–36 and accompanying text. 
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Timothy Geithner unveiled the “stress tests” plan for large banks.216 
The test is aimed at enabling the government to determine the 
strength of a bank’s balance sheet, and hence further enhances the 
government’s involvement in the banking arena.217 These actions, 
coupled with those involving direct equity positions in banks, 
indicate that the government is taking greater control over the 
banking system, which the legal origins theory suggests should not 
be a fundamental solution to America’s economic and financial 
problems.  
Outside of banking, the government has embraced actions that 
expand its control over industries in a manner that belies the legal 
origins theory’s predictions. Like government control over banking, 
civil law is closely associated with a “heav[y] hand of government 
ownership and regulation.”218 And yet, despite its common law 
roots, the U.S. government has responded to the crisis in a similar 
vein. Three examples highlight this phenomenon. First, the 
government seized control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In so 
doing, the government became the owner or guarantor of some 
forty-two percent of American mortgages219 and, therefore, directly 
regulates a sizeable chunk of the mortgage industry. One expert 
called the government’s decision to take over Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, “one of the most sweeping government interventions 
in private financial markets in decades.”220 Second, the government’s 
actions related to AIG have resulted in the government injecting as 
much as $173 billion into AIG221 and owning almost eighty percent 
of its shares, essentially reflecting a nationalization of AIG222 at odds 
with the common law tradition.  
A third example is the failed and then revitalized response to the 
problems in the automobile industry. Under the final Auto Plan, the 
government not only acquires a stake in auto companies, but its 
stake is even greater than those acquired in the banking arena. 
 
 216. See Deborah Solomon & Jon Hilsenrath, Bank Capital Gets Stress Test, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 26, 2009, at A3. 
 217. See id. 
 218. La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 286, 298. 
 219. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 40, at 25. 
 220. Zachary A. Goldfarb et al., Treasury to Rescue Fannie and Freddie: Regulators Seek to 
Keep Firms’ Troubles From Setting Off Wave of Bank Failures, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2008, at 
A01.  
 221. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 40, at 34. 
 222. See id. at 30–34. 
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Moreover, in addition to restrictions on dividends and executive 
compensation, the Auto Plan restricts certain expenditures and 
requires auto executives to submit restructuring plans that have a 
host of target goals, including restructuring contracts with various 
stakeholders. The fact that the first two auto bills provided for the 
creation of an auto czar emphasizes the levels of control embodied in 
the legislative response, and the final Auto Plan’s reliance on the 
Treasury Secretary does little to negate this emphasis. Reflecting the 
extent of government intervention in the industry, one commentator 
referred to the government’s actions as “Nationalizing Detroit.”223 
From a legal origins perspective, the terms of all of the auto plans do 
not reflect America’s common law ideologies, discrediting the notion 
that its origins would dictate the manner in which the United States 
responds to crisis. By straying from its origins, America’s response 
suggests that factors beyond legal origins have played a greater role 
in shaping its behavior. 
Another government response highlighting its interventionist 
tendencies is its active participation in deal structuring. For instance, 
the government was actively involved in structuring the deal to have 
JP Morgan purchase Bear Stearns. Its involvement included rejecting 
market-based solutions in favor of a government-controlled response 
to Bear Stearns’s distress.224 Similarly, the government played a 
critical role in structuring a deal for Wachovia, pursuant to which the 
FDIC selected Citigroup as a suitor and initially rebuffed attempts by 
Wells Fargo to participate in the transaction. As Professors Davidoff 
and Zaring note, these actions reveal a “preference for orderly as 
opposed to market solutions.”225 Of course, Wells Fargo eventually 
acquired Citigroup with the government’s approval. However, the 
government continued its role as dealmaker so that when Citigroup 
sued Wells Fargo and Wachovia, the FDIC intervened and attempted 
to mediate among the parties.226 The government also played an 
instrumental role in both the Washington Mutual and Bank of 
 
 223. See James L. Gattuso, Auto Bailout Bill: Nationalizing Detroit?, HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION WEB MEMO NO. 2164, Dec. 9, 2008, http://www.heritage.org/research/ 
economy/wm2164.cfm. 
 224. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 40, at 12. Because only the Fed would provide 
financial assistance to JP Morgan, it essentially locked other potential bidders out of the 
process. Id. 
 225. Id. at 42. 
 226. Id. at 43. 
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America transactions.227 Finally, the government structured 
transactions for the automakers, apparently forcing Chrysler to 
declare bankruptcy and enter into negotiations with particular 
parties.228 Because common law countries are supposed to prefer 
market-based solutions over government-sponsored transactions, this 
kind of extensive interaction seems at odds with the United States 
common law tradition.  
This discussion reveals that, from its role as dealmaker to its 
actions that serve to control banking activities and the actions of 
entities in other industries, the government embraced practices that 
ran counter to its legal origins. 
4. The marginalization of judicial review 
Perhaps more troubling than the reliance on legislation is the 
role that the legislation carves out for the courts. The bedrock of the 
common law system is reliance on judicial rulemaking to shape the 
law and respond to social and economic problems.229 It is then 
notable that the Paulson Plan introducing the first TARP proposal 
made no role for judicial authority at all.230 Instead, the Paulson Plan 
indicated that the Treasury Secretary’s decisions “may not be 
reviewed by any court of law or any administrative agency.”231 The 
Paulson Plan provided for the Treasury Secretary to report to 
Congress, while authorizing the Treasury Secretary to take any 
actions it deemed necessary to carry out the purchases.232 The 
ultimate Stabilization Act did provide for very limited judicial review 
under an arbitrary and capricious standard. While this is a standard 
used for all agency decisions, its deferential nature scarcely allows for 
significant judicial rulemaking.233 Given the central role judicial 
 
 227. See id. at 41–42. 
 228. See Rutenberg & Vlasic, supra note 187, and accompanying text. 
 229. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 303–05. 
 230. The first TARP plan was only three pages and rested the sole discretion of the plan 
with the Treasury Secretary. See Davidoff and Zaring, supra note 40, at 47. 
 231. See Draft of Paulson Plan, supra note 109. 
 232. This means that the lack of judicial review is accompanied by an apparent lack of 
Congressional review. See Davidoff and Zaring, supra note 40, at 48–49 (noting that the bill 
may have unconstitutionally delegated an undefined amount of Congress’s power to the 
Treasury and as a result, the bill likely would have been problematic under the nondelegation 
doctrine). 
 233. On the one hand, Professors Davidoff and Zaring do note that the government wins 
between 55–65% of cases under such a standard, id. at 52, suggesting that there is a substantial 
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rulemaking plays in the common law tool kit, this relatively minimal 
role also undermines the extent to which the legal origins theory 
may be viewed as influencing government actions in this area. 
The Fed’s prominent role in the crisis response further 
diminished the role for judicial oversight. This is because, in many 
respects, the Fed’s actions apparently are removed from judicial 
review. Thus, courts have not substantively reviewed monetary policy 
decisions and bank financial assistance.234 For example, when 
shareholders challenged the Bear Stearns deal, the Delaware 
Chancery court refused to review the decision.235 Similarly, Bear 
Stearns shareholders opted to forgo challenging the deal in New 
York based on concerns that the court would be reluctant to review 
the deal.236 In relying primarily on the Fed, the governmental 
response inevitably strayed from reliance on judicial rulemaking or 
review.  
As the foregoing discussion reveals, the United States response 
has been guided by initiatives and tools that are distinctly civil law in 
nature. The embrace of these civil law devices not only suggests that 
the crisis prompted the United States to reject its origins, but also 
that other forces, such as social or political concerns, have driven its 
response more than any adherence to such origins. 
B. A Second Look at the Kit and Tools 
To be sure, if one looks more deeply at the United States crisis 
response, strands of its legal origins emerge. While those strands may 
not overcome the heavy focus on civil law strategies, they 
nevertheless suggest that the legal origins theory many have some 
predictive value even in the midst of crisis.  
1. Nationalization by any other name . . . 
As an initial matter, the characterization of America’s relationship 
with banks as nationalization appears to be exaggerated. This is 
 
percentage of cases successfully challenged. On the other hand, because the Act prohibited any 
form of equitable relief, it leaves unclear how the judicial review would work in practice. Id. In 
other words, the Act itself may have stripped the teeth out of any purported judicial review. See 
id. (“[T]he bill appeared to grant judicial review in one section, and then took it away, by 
taking away equitable relief, in the other section.”). 
 234. Id. at 15. 
 235. Id. at 19. 
 236. Id. at 10–20. 
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because the government’s actions do not really amount to control 
over the banks. Indeed, the equity positions the government takes in 
the banks must either be nonvoting or taken with the agreement not 
to vote. Moreover, as is clear from the backlash associated with the 
government’s apparent inability to prohibit problematic practices at 
banks and other institutions, much of the newly enacted legislation 
does not dictate bank lending practices nor does it require banks to 
account for how they spend government funds. The TARP program 
has been criticized because lawmakers cannot track how the money is 
spent, revealing that it has no real control over banks and how they 
operate or use their resources.237 To be sure, all of these things have 
been viewed as causes for concern—and it seems like they will be 
altered going forward—but the lack of control over bank practices 
and procedures undermines the nationalization claim.238 It also 
suggests that the legislation has been implemented in a way that is 
consistent with America’s traditions of allowing the banking industry 
to shape its own policies, even if that implementation is detrimental 
and may breed fraud. 
Moreover, the government has taken great pains to ensure that 
its investment activities did not amount to nationalization. Hence, 
with respect to Citigroup, instead of creating a relatively straight-
forward transaction that would lead to nationalization, the 
government created a complicated financing structure for some of its 
Citigroup investments to avoid the appearance of nationalization. In 
doing so, the government displayed its willingness to “‘bend[] over 
backwards’” to prevent nationalization.239 These concerted efforts 
indicate a strong allegiance to the common law’s rejection of 
controlling banks even in the midst of crisis. As a result, they confirm 
the enduring influence of legal origins. 
2. Paved with good intentions? 
Another factor supporting the legal origins theory is the stated 
purpose behind America’s regulation and legislation. Indeed, the 
 
 237. See Jack Healy, Regulators Urge Better Oversight of Bailout Fund, NYTIMES.COM, 
Feb. 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/business/worldbusiness/05iht-
06tarp.19963306.html. 
 238. See id. (noting lack of oversight programs with TARP and that it was vulnerable to 
fraud).  
 239. Enrich & Solomon, supra note 95 (quoting the chief investment officer of Spectrum 
Asset Management). 
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legal origins theory would be irrelevant if it could not account for 
the growth of the regulatory state. However, proponents of the 
theory insist that legal origins predicts a distinction between 
common law and civil law countries based on their rationale for 
regulation. Common law oriented countries regulate for the purpose 
of supporting and rehabilitating markets.240 This rationale certainly 
appears to be embedded in most of America’s regulation aimed at 
responding to the crisis. The Paulson Plan provided that in 
exercising authority to distribute government funds, the Treasury 
consider two principles: “providing stability or preventing disruption 
to the financial markets or banking system[,] and protecting the 
taxpayer.”241 These considerations mirror the common law concern 
with protecting private property and supporting markets.  
Such considerations find their counterpart in many other 
initiatives. The preamble of the Stimulus Act indicates that its 
purpose is to “provide economic stimulus . . . [and] incentives for 
business investment . . . .”242 The preamble of the Stabilization Act 
indicates that its purpose is to stabilize the financial system and 
prevent disruption in the economy.243 The Reinvestment Act’s 
purpose included stabilizing government budgets and promoting 
economic recovery.244 Along these lines, much of the Fed’s actions 
were designed to shore up the credit markets and forestall a 
deepening crisis.245 The Fed’s commercial paper facility was designed 
to increase liquidity, while TALF was designed to increase the 
availability of credit and thereby support economic activity.246 In 
each of these instances, the United States rhetoric and rationale 
coincide with a legal origins orientation. To the extent the rationale 
 
 240. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 308–09. 
 241. Draft of Paulson Plan, supra note 109. 
 242. Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613 (2008). 
 243. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 
(2008). 
 244. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, 123 Stat. 
115. Of note, the Reinvestment Act’s purposes sweeps more broadly, encompassing a desire to 
preserve and create jobs and assist those impacted by the recession. See id. These broader 
mandates are less compatible with a common law ideology, and perhaps reflect the influence of 
the political shift. 
 245. See supra notes 182–83. 
 246. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Nov. 25, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125a.htm; see also Healy, 
supra note 237 (noting that the aim of the consumer lending program is to draw customers 
back to frozen student, car, and business loan markets). 
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for regulation matters more than the tools used to implement that 
regulation, these statements of purpose validate the influence of legal 
origins. 
3. Ideology reconsidered 
Another indication of the relevance of the legal origins theory 
may be in the difficulties with enacting legislation and other 
regulation. Certainly the Fed’s refusal to bail out Lehman Brothers 
reflected its desire to adhere to legal origins, and hence prefer market 
forces to government intervention, even if those forces hastened the 
demise of a financial institution. The possibility that the refusal may 
have worsened the economic crisis only underscores the strength of 
the commitment to common law ideas. Congress’s refusal to bailout 
the auto industry also stemmed in part from a desire to steer clear of 
government control. And this desire emerged with each successive 
stimulus package, making passage of such packages difficult even 
when lawmakers were informed that delay could have severe 
repercussions for the economy. Hence, despite the apparent need for 
government intervention, America’s commitment to common law 
ideologies made it difficult to embrace that intervention without 
deep reservations. Echoing these reservations, Bush noted that he 
was “forced . . . to ignore many of the free-market principles he 
came to office embracing.”247  
Even after enactment, America’s commitment to common law 
principles appears to have prompted it to engage in actions counter 
to its self-interest. For example, providing the necessary capital to the 
banking industry while avoiding equity stakes and other appearances 
of government control of the banking industry required the U.S. 
government to engage in unprecedented financial gymnastics.248 
Moreover, the administration of TARP is plagued with problems 
associated with the government not wanting to appear as if it owns 
banks.249 These actions make administering TARP and other 
programs more opaque and difficult, but they reflect America’s 
commitment to common law principles, even where civil ones may 
 
 247. David E. Sanger et al., Bush Aids Detroit, but Hard Choices Wait for Obama, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008, at A1. 
 248. See Andrews, supra note 212, at B1 (noting that aid packages to Bank of America 
and Citigroup reflected “displays of financial gymnastics aimed at providing capital without 
appearing to take commanding equity stakes”). 
 249. See id. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2010 7:54 PM 
1571 The Legal Origins Theory in Crisis 
 1617 
be more efficient. Although its response was ultimately legislative in 
nature, the United States’ deep reservations and financial gymnastics 
may highlight its core commitment to legal origins even in financial 
upheaval. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When you look at the United States response to financial crisis in 
light of its legal origins, what emerges is a potentially mixed story. 
On the one hand, the government appears to have adopted strategies 
wholly antithetical to its legal origins. Perhaps most troubling are the 
transactions that appear to result in nationalization of certain banks 
and certain industries. Equally troubling is the heavy government 
intervention—from bailouts to its role as direct and primary 
negotiator in a wide variety of transactions. These actions, combined 
with the government’s embrace of steadily broader legislation, belie 
any prediction that America’s response would gravitate towards 
common law strategies and ideologies. Hence, they pose problems 
for the predictive value of the legal origins theory, at least with 
respect to the current crisis. 
On the other hand, some strands of the crisis legislation and the 
United States response firmly embrace its origins and at least reflect a 
rhetorical commitment to them. This may suggest that during times 
of severe crisis, political, social, and, most importantly, economic 
forces may compel the United States to adopt civil-law oriented 
solutions. However, those forces do not compel the United States to 
eliminate its fundamental orientation. In this regard, legal origins is 
relevant, because it may explain the way in which the United States’ 
problem-solving is inherently limited, while also predicting the 
temporary nature of those civil-law oriented solutions.  
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